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Harold Maier, Comity, and the
Foreign Relations Restatement
Andreas F. Lowenfeld*

Hal Maier's career and mine have interacted in several respects.
We have both served in the Legal Adviser's Office of the State
Department; we have both taught Conflict of Laws as well as
International Law; and we have both tried to show-I believe
successfully-that there is no sharp divide between "Public
International Law" and "Private International Law." In particular,
we have both been interested in the reach and limits of economic
regulation across international frontiers, initially in connection with
antitrust and securities regulation, but also in connection with
economic sanctions, pollution controls, and other interactions of
governmental and private activity.
Generally, Professor Maier and I have come out in the same way
on particular issues. We have both advocated reduced emphasis on
power and sovereignty and greater emphasis on restraint and
flexibility in application of the law of the forum to activity with links
to more than one state. Yet there has been a fundamental difference
between us which grew as what became the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law was being drafted, debated, and eventually
accepted by the American Law Institute.
Though I was in the middle of the debate as a proponent of the
Restatement, I am not sure that I ever completely understood the
intensity of the controversy centered on § 403, Limitations on
Jurisdiction to Prescribe.That Section, as all who participated in or
observed the debate know, provides that even when one of the
essential prerequisites to the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction is
present-i.e., a link of territoriality or nationality-a state may not
exercise its jurisdiction if doing so would be unreasonable (Subsection
(1)). The Section goes on to set out a list of criteria designed to give
guidance in evaluating the reasonableness or unreasonableness of
exercise of jurisdiction in a given situation (Subsection (2)). Finally
Subsection (3) attempts to cope with the situation where it would not
be unreasonable for either state A or state B to apply its law, but the
two laws are in conflict.
Many persons criticized this approach. Some thought § 403
would legitimize excessive intervention by the United States in
matters where it did not belong. Others thought the opposite, that
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§ 403, if it remained in the Restatement, would curb the activity of
the U.S. government in exercise of its sovereignty. Professor Maier's
complaints were different. On the one hand, if I understand him,
§ 403 and the Sections that elaborate on the basic approach in
particular contexts, are insufficiently attentive to the needs of the
international system as a whole, as contrasted with balancing the
interests of only state A and state B. On the other hand, Maier
thought that the approach of the Restatement was insufficiently
conceptual,
substituting
pragmatism-reasonableness-for
philosophical purity. As to balancing of interests, Maier, like many
judges and commentators, distrusted the process but could not quite
avoid it. And Maier never liked the use of "reasonableness" as the
critical concept.
In a forty-page article in the American Journal of International
Law shortly after publication of the first version of § 403,1 Maier
wrote:
Above all, it is essential that section 403 provide a general context in
which the relevance of the various elements mentioned can be viewed.
Reasonableness is a relative term. To be fully effective in accomplishing
its purpose, section 403 must make it explicit that jurisdiction depends
upon reasonableness measured not only in the light of the interests
having direct connection with the case, but also measured in the light of
the needs of the international system ..
Tentative Draft No. 2 places . . . not nearly enough emphasis on the
role of the court or other decision maker as a facilitator of transnational
interaction whose task should be to decide so as to coordinate the
exercise of national power to serve the needs of all states for an
2
effectively functioning system.

To the Reporters who were in any event accused of making up lawof prestating rather than restating-Maier's injunction seemed to go
well beyond our mandate, even if we had known how to accomplish
what Professor McDougal, as quoted by Maier, called "the final
3
task."
In his next article relevant to the present discussion, Maier was
more sympathetic to interest balancing, but not by courts:
The development of processes to resolve conflicting claims of
authority to forbid or require conduct within a nation's borders, is most

1.

RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES, (1981) [hereinafter Tent. Draft No. 2].

2.
Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An
Intersection between Public and Private InternationalLaw, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 303
(1982).
3.
Id. at 301 (citing MYRES S. McDoUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL & IVAN A.
VLASIc, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 748 (1963)).
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appropriately carried out by diplomatic exchange, not by judicial
decisions. 4 ...
In the diplomatic forum, the label "balancing of interests" merely
characterize the ordinary international law formation process of
demand, response and eventual accommodation in the light of
5
reciprocal national needs and tolerances.

To my surprise on reading this article two decades later, Maier used
as his principal illustration the controversy over the attempt by the
United States in 1982 to impede construction of a natural gas
pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe to punish the Soviet Union
for its crackdown on liberalization in Poland. 6 Maier tells the story as
a conflict resolved, after some months, by diplomacy. My reading of
that episode is quite different. I regard the assertion of jurisdiction to
prescribe conduct by foreign firms in foreign countries based on an
unprecedented and unpersuasive link to the United States (the use of
technology licensed by private U.S. companies) as failure by the U.S.
government and particularly by its legal advisers to heed the limits
on the exercise of jurisdiction as set out in the Restatement. In fact in
the summer of 1982, as the sanctions were still in force but subject to
sharp controversy, the State Department's Legal Adviser urged that
§ 403 (as well as the section concerning jurisdiction over foreign
subsidiaries) be withdrawn, precisely because he thought that
acceptance of the Restatement would curb the freedom of the U.S.
government. 7 My conclusion is that the forced retreat of the U.S.
government and the resignation of the Secretary of State were
confirmation that the principles set out in the Restatement were
correct. The action of the U.S. government was unreasonable, and
therefore unlawful, and could not stand.8
I do not disagree with Maier over the outcome, and I do not
disagree that the Pipeline case was not suitable for resolution by a
national court. But I do not think looking to "comity," which Maier
defined as a blend of "legal policies" and "high international politics,"9

4.

Harold G. Maier, Interest Balancing and ExtraterritorialJurisdiction,31

AM. J. COMP. L. 579, 581 (1983).

5.
Id. at 584.
6.
Id. at 580-86.
7.
Indeed, the European Community cited the draft Restatement in an AideM~moire supporting the protests of the European governments. Aide Mgmoire of
European Economic Community Concerning President Reagan's Decision About the
Pipeline (July 14, 1982), 21 I.L.M. 891, reproduced in ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, TRADE
CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL ENDS DS-307 (2d ed. 1983).

8.

For my treatment of the Pipeline case, see ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD,

CONFLICT OF LAWS, FEDERAL, STATE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 977-81 (2d

rev. ed. 2002) and LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL ENDS, supra note 7, at
267-306. A brief account of the episode, with bibliography, appears in the final version
of the Restatement. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE

UNITED STATES § 414 reporters' note 8 (1987).
9.
Maier, supra note 4, at 589.
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is preferable to looking to limits on jurisdiction of states defined in
terms of reasonableness, that is as law.
Maier entitled the third in this series of articles, "Resolving
Extraterritorial Conflicts, or 'There and Back Again,"' 10 "The
characterization 'comity,"' he wrote in criticism of the Restatement "is
replaced by the characterization 'reasonableness' but, despite the
difference in terminology, they serve precisely the same purpose.""i If
the issue were really one of terminology, one might wonder why
Maier would be so upset, since he acknowledged that, compared to
§ 40 of the Second Restatement, the proposed Restatement (Revised)
contains an appropriately expanded list of considerations to be taken
into account by the decisionmaker. 12 But there was a change from
the formulation in § 40, which read, in pertinent part:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law
and the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the
part of a person, each state is required by international law to consider,
in good faith, moderating the exercise of the enforcement jurisdiction in
13
the light of [such factors as those listed].

In contrast, the formulation in § 403(3) to which Maier's 1984 article
was addressed, read:
An exercise of jurisdiction which is not unreasonable according to the
criteria indicated in Subsection (2) may nevertheless be unreasonable if
it requires a person to take action that would violate a regulation of
another state which is not unreasonable under those criteria.
Preference between conflicting exercises of jurisdiction is determined by
evaluating the respective interests of the regulating states in light of
the factors listed in Subsection (2). 14

Whereas the prior Restatement spoke in terms of good faith and
moderation, the proposal for the new Restatement seemed to suggest
(though it did not say so directly) that if the state with the lesser
interest nevertheless applied its law, that might be unreasonable,
and by the definition in Subsection (1), therefore unlawful. The
justification for the changed approach was explained in a comment to

10.
25 VA. J. INT'L L. 7 (1984).
11.
Id. at 10.
12.
Throughout the first six drafts, the project was entitled "Foreign Relations
Law of the United States (Revised)." In fact the Reporters decided early on not to work
on a revision of the 1965 work, but to start afresh, with cross references where
appropriate.
Eventually we persuaded the American Law Institute to call the
completed project "Restatement (Third) ....
"
13.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 40 (1965) (emphasis added).

14.
It is worth noting that in the final published version, the tern "preference"
does not appear, nor does the statement that an exercise of jurisdiction by the state
with the lesser interest "may nevertheless be unreasonable.
For the final version,
see infra note 26.
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§ 403 in the first published version, 15 and perhaps made somewhat
clearer in the final version:
Some United States courts have applied the principle of reasonableness
as a requirement of comity, that term being understood not merely as
an act of discretion and courtesy but as reflecting a sense of obligation
among states. This section states the principle of reasonableness as a
rule of international law. The principle applies regardless of the status
of relations between the state exercising jurisdiction and another state
whose interests may be affected. While the term "comity" is sometimes
understood to include a requirement of reciprocity, the rule of this
section is not conditional on a finding that the state affected by a
regulation would exercise or limit its jurisdiction in the same
16
circumstances to the same extent.

Maier certainly got the point:
The key concept added by section § 403 is the proposition that all
jurisdictional determinations should be guided by the principle of
reasonableness and that international law forbids a state to exercise
17
jurisdiction when its exercise is unreasonable.

But then he went one step further, reading into § 403 something that
was not there but that stirred up many persons in and out of the U.S.
government, including the State Department's Legal Adviser referred
to at note 6 above. Referring to my 1979 Hague Lectures which
anticipated the Restatement approach,18 Maier wrote:
Professor Lowenfeld's lectures and, to an even greater extent, the
original section 403, appear to convert international law as a limiting
law, designed to describe the confines of national prescriptive authority,
into a prescribing law, conferring jurisdiction to prescribe solely upon
the state with the most reasonable connection with the transaction in
situations where nations having concurrent jurisdiction have issued
conflicting commands.

In other words . . . in every situation of concurrent jurisdiction it can
only be reasonable for a single nation to have authority to apply its law
19
to the events or persons in the case at issue.

I suppose that if someone as bright and thoughtful as Professor
Maier misunderstood, that is the fault of those who drafted and
presented the critical text. But it was a misunderstanding. In
rejecting comity as entailing too much politics and too much
discretion, we did not reject the need to exercise judgment. Though

15.
Tent. Draft No. 2, supra note 1, at cmt. a.
16.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 403 cmt. a (1987).
17.
Maier, supra note 10, at 17.
18.
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Public Law in the InternationalArena: Conflict of
Laws, InternationalLaw, and Some Suggestions for their Interaction, 63 RECUEIL DES
COURS 31 (Hague Academy of Int'l L. 311 1979).
19.
Maier, supra note 10, at 19.
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the formulation of § 403(3) was changed several times in the course of
arriving at a final text, it always contemplated the need to make
choices when it would not be unreasonable for more than one state to
exercise jurisdiction. The obligation stated in § 403(3) was to evaluate
the interest of both states in light of the criteria of § 403(2). It did not
follow, as Maier asserted, that it can only be reasonable for a single
nation to have authority to apply its law.
While Maier was at work on this article, Judge Malcolm Wilkey
of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit issued a
long opinion in the U.S. phase of the famous Laker case, which pitted
U.S. and English courts against one another. Laker Airways, an
independent English airline, had brought an antitrust action in the
United States alleging that it had been driven out of business by a
cartel led by British Airways. British Airways had obtained an antisuit injunction (later overturned) in the English court, and Laker had
obtained an anti-anti-suit injunction from the federal district court in
the District of Columbia.2 0 Judge Wilkey, for the majority (with Judge
Starr dissenting) upheld the anti-anti-suit injunction but took the
occasion to criticize interest balancing and, in particular, the criteria
set out in § 403(2) of the Restatement, then still in draft.21 Maier felt
vindicated:
Judge Wilkey's principal objection to the process proposed in section
403 went directly to the heart of the reasonableness standard. He read
the section in the same way that it was interpreted by the Office of
Legal Adviser and agreed that no rule of international law gave
exclusive jurisdiction to the nation having the most reasonable
22
connection with the situation."

Maier wrote that
[t]he Laker opinion exerted a major influence on the current form and
substance of section 403, not only because it was the principal judicial
opinion interpreting the proposed original form of the section but also
because it addressed a problem that had been raised by other
23
commentators, including the Office of the Legal Adviser.

That may well be right, though the Reporters did not think that a
major substantive change was called for. As Maier reported in his
article, Professor Henkin, the Chief Reporter of the Restatement,
wrote to Davis Robinson, the Legal Adviser, and I wrote directly to
Judge Wilkey, who in fact was an adviser to the Restatement. Both

20.
Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgium World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 915
(D.C. Cir. 1984). For a detailed account of the Laker case in the United Kingdom and
the United States, see ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND
ARBITRATION 121-36, 138-45 (3d ed. 2006).
21.
731 F.2d at 948-51.
22.
Maier, supra note 10, at 34 (discussing 731 F.2d at 952). Professor Maier
at the time was serving as Counselor on International Law in the State Department.
23.
Maier, supra note 10, at 36.
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Henkin and I objected to Wilkey's reading of § 403 as calling for
jurisdiction of only one state, making essentially the same points
made above. Maier quoted both from Henkin and me and from Judge
Wilkey's reply. The outcome was that Judge Wilkey and Professor
Maier persisted in asserting that we had drafted a rule calling for
exclusive jurisdiction by the state with the greater interest, and the
Reporters denied that that was their intent but agreed to change the
text of § 403(3) in the direction urged by Wilkey and Maier. As
Professor Henkin explained to the final Annual Meeting on the
Restatement, "[iun this final go-around we sort of split the difference,
but not evenly. '2 4 Thus, the final version provides that while the call
for evaluation of one's own as well as the other state's interest is
stated to be mandatory ("each state has an obligation"), the call for
deference to the other state if that state's interest was greater is
stated to be merely hortatory-"a state should-not shall but
should-defer given to the other state whose interest is clearly
greater." 25 When a motion was made at the Annual Meeting of the
Institute to add the words "as a matter of international law" in the
Comment to § 403(3), the words were rejected. I did not think that
this represented acceptance of what Maier called the "informing
principle of international comity." For Maier, however, "[t]he journey
'26
there and back again was arduous but well worth it."
Having, as he thought, won the battle, Maier might have rested
his case. But though he did turn to other issues, his concern with
comity and with the Restatement continued. Writing about the effect
of the Hague Evidence Convention after the Supreme Court had
granted review in the A6rospatiale case but before the Court had
issued its opinion, 27 Maier urged a comity approach to application of
the Convention. Accordingly, he urged rejection of the position of the
Court of Appeals that the Convention had no application to

24.
See ALI Proceedings 1986, p. 94. The transcript of the debate at that
meeting on § 403(3) runs from p. 93 to p. 107. Prof. Maier was present, but did not
speak to that section. See Harold G. Maier, Book Review, 83 Am. J. Int'l L. 676, 67679 (1989) (reviewing THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF NATIONAL LAWS (Dieter
Lange & Gary Born eds., 1987) and providing Prof. Maier's summary of the debate).
In its final form, § 403(3) reads:
25.
When it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise
jurisdiction over a person or activity, but the prescriptions by the two states are
in conflict, each state has an obligation to evaluate its own as well as the other
state's interest in exercising jurisdiction, in light of all the relevant factors,
including those set out in Subsection (2); a state should defer to the other state
if that state's interest is clearly greater.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 403(3) (1987).
26.
Maier, supra note 10, at 41.
27.
See Maier, ExtraterritorialDiscovery: Cooperation,Coercion and the Hague
Evidence Convention, 19 VAND. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 239 (1986).
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production of evidence in possession of a party over whom the court
had personal jurisdiction.2 8 But whereas he had previously argued
that in rejecting the term comity and stressing reasonableness the
drafters of the Restatement had paid insufficient attention to
diplomacy and political considerations, he now criticized the lower
courts, as well as the U.S. government's amicus brief, for treating
comity as too much informed by political considerations:
Both the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Anschuetz and the Eighth Circuit's
opinion in Airospatiale are fundamentally in error to the extent that
they treat comity as a principle emphasizing primarily political
considerations-namely, avoiding insults to foreign governments-in
decisions determining whether the Hague Evidence Convention should
be given priority in cases of this type. Rather, comity is a concept whose
application is informed by principles of national self-interest in
maintaining a climate of reciprocal tolerance and goodwill. A decision
based on considerations of comity may, as a by-product, avoid annoying
a foreign nation, but preventing international tension is not the comity
29
principle's main juridical role.

One might say that Maier's criteria of what he called in the next
paragraph "this fundamental misunderstanding" of comity by U.S.
courts justified the reluctance of the drafters of the Restatement to
base their approach on the term comity. But of course that was not
Maier's point. On the contrary, he was prepared to invoke the
Restatement's provision on disclosure of evidence located abroad
(§ 437 in the tentative final draft of 1986, § 442 in the permanent
published version) in support of his argument in Agrospatiale. He
wrote, "Although the Reporters refused to use the term 'comity' to
describe the interest analysis required by section 403,. . . it is quite
clear that that section's final form is more directly informed by the
30
comity principle than by the international law-formation process.1
When the A6rospatiale case reached the Supreme Court, the
Justices were unanimous in rejecting the holding of the lower courts
that the Evidence Convention had no application to requests for
discovery from parties over which the court had personal
jurisdiction.3 1 But on the issue of whether or when the trial court
should order first resort to the Convention, the Court split 5-4. The
majority, per Justice Stevens, held that resort to the Convention was
simply one of the options open to the trial court, with no general
presumption in favor of resort to the Convention mechanism in
preference to the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil

28.
In re Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale, 782 F.2d 120 (8th Cir.
1986), vacated and remanded, Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. U.S. Dist.
Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522 (1987); see also In re Anschuetz & Co., 754
F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985), vacated, 483 U.S. 1002 (1987).
29.
Maier, supra note 27, at 252-53.
30.
Id. at 259.
31.
Agrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 522.
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Procedure. Referring to the Restatement section dedicated to
discovery, the majority wrote that "the concept of international
comity requires in this context a more particularized analysis of the
nation
respective interests of the foreign nation and the requesting
32
than petitioners' proposed general rule would generate."
The dissenters, in a long opinion by Justice Blackmun, rejected
the case-by-case approach advocated by the U.S. government and
accepted by the majority. In support of a first resort prescription,
Justice Blackmun wrote:
The principle of comity leads to more definite rules than the ad hoc
approach endorsed by the majority... Comity is not just a vague political
concern favoring international cooperation when it is in our interest to
do so. Rather it is a principle under which judicial decisions reflect the
systemic value of reciprocal tolerance and goodwill. See Maier,
33
Extrajudicial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads.

Six years later, in the international phase of the Insurance
Antitrust Case, 3 4 the Supreme Court again faced the issue of the
reach of U.S. law in the face of inconsistent or conflicting foreign law.
The issue was whether U.S. antitrust law could or should be applied
to challenge an agreement, made in London by English reinsurers
consistently with English law and policy, to limit the available
coverage of certain risks in the United States. Judge Schwarzer in
the federal district court in San Francisco had dismissed the action on
the basis that "the conflict with English law and policy which would
result from the extraterritorial application of the [U.S.] antitrust laws
in this cases is not outweighed by other factors." 35 The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had reversed and reinstated the action
on the ground that the conflict was outweighed by the "significance of
the effects on American commerce, their foreseeability and their
purposefulness. ' 36 Once again the Supreme Court split 5-4. This
time, neither side cited Maier, but each side relied on the
Restatement for its conclusion.
The majority, per Justice Souter, held that there was no true
conflict at all, because English law permitted but did not require the
conduct challenged under U.S. law. 37 Thus, as the majority saw it,
§ 403(3) of the Restatement, the Section that had been the major
source of controversy between Professor Maier and the Reporters of
the Restatement-did not apply. Justice Souter quoted from
Comment e to § 403, which states that Subsection (3) does not apply

32.

Id. at 543-44.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 554, 555 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
In re Ins. Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. 464, 490 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
In re Ins. Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 934 (9th Cir. 1991).
Hartford, 509 U.S. at 765.
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where a person subject to regulation by two states can comply with
38
the laws of both.
Justice Scalia for the dissenters, wrote:
...the practice of using international law to limit the extraterritorial
reach of statutes is firmly established in our jurisprudence ... Whether
the Restatement precisely reflects international law in every detail
matters little here, as I believe this litigation would be resolved the
same way under virtually any conceivable test that takes account of
39
foreign regulatory interests.

Literally, the only support that the Court adduces for its position is
§ 403 of the Restatement (Third)-or more precisely Comment e to that
provision.... The Court has completely misinterpreted this provision.
Subsection (3) of § 403 (requiring one State to defer to another [if that
State's interest is clearly greater]) comes into play only after subsection
(1) of § 403 has been complied with-i.e. after it has been determined
that the exercise of jurisdiction by both of the two states is not
"unreasonable." That prior question is answered by applying the factors
set forth in subsection (2) of § 403, that is, precisely the factors ... that
40
the Court rejects.

I was pleased (and somewhat surprised) by the first quoted
sentence in Justice's Scalia's opinion and by his willingness to accept
the Restatement as his guide to international law-at least in this
context. 41 I also agree with his statement that § 403(3) comes into
play only after Subsection (1) of § 403 has been complied with, that isthat exercise of jurisdiction by either state would not be
unreasonable. I would not have said, and did not say, that exercise of
jurisdiction by the United States, the place of the intended effect of
the challenged agreement, would be unreasonable. But under a
broader understanding of conflict than Justice Souter allowed, if it
would be reasonable (or as the Restatement preferred "not
unreasonable") for each state to assert its jurisdiction over the
challenged agreement, § 403(3) would call for comparison of the
relative interests of the two states "in light of all the relevant factors,
including those set out in § 403(2)." Though both the majority and the
dissenters in the Supreme Court invoked the Restatement, neither
side undertook that comparison.
With benefit of hindsight, I would have liked to make clearer
that the likelihood of conflict (§ 402(2)(h)) is applicable both in
determining reasonableness in the first place and as one of the
criteria for making the evaluations under § 403(3). I would not have

38.
Id. at 799.
39.
Id. at 818 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
40.
Id. at 821.
41.
I should mention that I was of counsel to the English insurers in Hartford.
After a sufficient pause, however, I have tried to write about this case in several places
as objectively as I could. See infra note 42.
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attempted one more draft of § 403, but Comment e might have used
some more work.
I do not know how Professor Maier would have come out in
Insurance Antitrust. Maier might well have concluded that § 403(3)
was applicable, on the ground that it would be impossible for the
English reinsurers to comply both with English law and policy and
with U.S. antitrust law, i.e., that Justice Souter's definition of
"conflict" was too narrow. 42 In that scenario, Maier would be faced
with the questions (a) which state's interest was "clearly greater,"
and (b) if the answer was England's, whether the U.S. court should or
should not defer. The Restatement, thanks in part to Professor
Maier's continual watchfulness, would give him substantial latitude,
whether in the name of comity or in the name of reasonableness.

42.
For development of the argument that Justice Souter and the majority
should not have equated conflict with compulsion, see Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Conflict,
Balancing of Interests and the Exercise of Jurisdictionto Prescribe:Reflections on the
Insurance Antitrust Case, 89 Am. J. Intl L. 42 (1995) (arguing that the majority
confused conflict with foreign compulsion). Note also that the RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987) contains a separate
section, § 441, on Foreign Government Compulsion, which generally looks to the
territory where an act is required or prohibited, and recognizes the defense of
compulsion in some instances even if the command or prohibition would be
unreasonable under the criteria of § 403. See § 441 cmts a, e.

